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In his 1879 speech before the Mississippi State Board of Health, Dr. John Brownrigg
gave a harrowing account of the destruction of yellow fever:
On Sunday, the 9th day of last August, in the stillness and beauty of a summer day, it was
announced in Grenada that yellow fever was epidemic….The besom of destruction has
swept over the place….The plague destroyed social organization and the mechanism of
civilization as if they had been living beings…. Its victims hide themselves to die like
wild beasts.1
Grenada was a common stop just south of where two lines of the Mississippi & Tennessee
Railroad merged in north Mississippi. Like many other towns, it had an open sewer, a hot
summer, and a nearby river. Despite these characteristics, which would become the focus of
disease prevention measures, Grenada had never before had an encounter with yellow fever.
Coastal areas—most prominently New Orleans—saw numerous epidemics, but rural inland areas
generally escaped the scourge of Yellow Jack. In the 1878 epidemic, however, hundreds died in
Grenada and a subsequent panic caused the majority of the town’s white residents to flee. The
death and destruction brought national attention to the small Mississippi community, until the
epidemic spread further beyond its normal region of infection, eventually reaching communities
across the South and even some cities in the North.2
Before the 1878 epidemic, there were outbreaks of yellow fever in cities around the
South. It was a terrible disease, and while scientists now know it is caused by a mosquito-borne
virus, its etiology was still not understood in the nineteenth century. Symptoms include fever,
liver failure, hemorrhages throughout the body, and vomit that is black from blood. It was also
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highly deadly, killing up to half of those infected with the most virulent strains. Citizens
throughout the South feared Yellow Jack.3
New Orleans, Louisiana, was the largest city in the South and one to which many
southern Mississippians felt both a close cultural connection and a close economic connection. It
also experienced epidemics multiple times each decade through the nineteenth century. As city
officials learned how to respond, New Orleans became a pioneer among Southern cities in public
health measures. Debates over the etiology of the disease led to disputes over how to combat
outbreaks. Initially, physicians believed it was caused by foul, moist, and hot air, meaning it was
noncontagious and limited to cities that were unclean. In the 1840s, however, groups outside
New Orleans argued that it was indeed a contagious disease that spread from the ports of the city
into rural regions and other communities around it. The New Orleans business elite initially
opposed the contagionists’ arguments for increased quarantines, since the measure closed off
whole communities and disrupted the economy, but better recordkeeping that tracked the spread
of the disease as it affected communities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama during an 1853
epidemic helped prove that the disease was communicable.4 After this outbreak, quarantines
became the most common way to combat the spread of yellow fever, and, prior to the Civil War,
states had complete control over these quarantines.5 The 1878 epidemic, however, caused states
and cities to revisit their public health systems.
Prior to the yellow fever outbreak in 1878, Mississippians generally supported a limited
Mississippi Board of Health that would merely advise counties on how to institute quarantines
3
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and leave counties the power to administer them. The extreme social and economic destruction
caused by yellow fever convinced many Mississippians that this system was inadequate for
proper protection, leading to calls for both a stronger state system and, more notably, the creation
of a powerful federal public health agency. Despite this change in mindset, the reforms that came
immediately after the epidemic focused only on establishing a quarantine system and did not
have a meaningful impact on Mississippi’s public health care system more generally. Ultimately,
Mississippians showed more concern about the threat of broadly powerful federal and state
governments to their local interests. When faced with a crisis that demanded a choice between
protecting public health and maintaining their systems of white supremacy, they chose the latter.
An array of primary sources opens a window into Grenada’s response to yellow fever and
its meaning. Letters, newspaper articles, charity logbooks, and political cartoons reveal a range
of responses to the 1878 epidemic among community members and outside providers of
assistance. Letters between members of the Grenada Yellow Fever Relief Committee, for
example, paint a picture of conflict. Amid the turmoil of the epidemic, parties in the town
positioned for control over relief monies and disputed the contributions of each other and African
American residents of the town. Newspapers—both in the fever-stricken South and in distant
places like New York City—published harrowing tales of destruction and hopeful tales of charity
drives and fundraising efforts. They also provide editors’ and politicians’ reactions to the
epidemic and the subsequent reform movement. Members of charity organizations, such as John
Logan Power of Jackson, Mississippi, compiled reports of aid. Their records illustrate the
nationwide relief efforts and the immense disruption to daily life that the epidemic caused.
Finally, these messages became even more poignant in the form of political cartoons. Illustrators
drew pictures of desperate families and charity drives during the epidemic to encourage
3

donations. Once the outbreak had subsided, they drew cartoons depicting prevention measures or
symbolic mythological figures to further their positions on how states’ rights and public health
should intertwine.
Historians have examined the effects of the 1878 yellow fever epidemic in the South
extensively. Francois Delaporte has discussed the research into the cause of the disease and
scientific beliefs about it from before the germ theory, the research into various bacteria, and the
breakthrough in 1900 that the Aedes aegypti mosquito spread the disease.6 Khaled Bloom, John
Ellis, Margaret Humphreys, and Jeanette Keith have all provided poignant narratives of many
communities, especially New Orleans and Memphis, Tennessee. They have also, to different
extents, examined the effects of the epidemic on health reforms, arguing that yellow fever
provided motivation to fund health boards.7 Deanne Stephens Nuwer conducted a similar
examination on the epidemic in Mississippi, while Ruth Janet Severson Haug looked at the
institutionalization of public health in Mississippi but focused on a later period. Jennifer Ford has
likewise focused on disease in Mississippi and post-1878 public health with her examination of a
typhoid fever outbreak in Oxford, Mississippi, in 1896.8
In addition to the responses of the government, various private charity organizations and
individual donors across the country responded to the 1878 epidemic. Edward Blum has looked
at the effect of the 1878 epidemic on reconciliation and charity between the North and the South
6
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in the post-Reconstruction era, demonstrating that the devastation in the South provided an
avenue for Northerners to help their American brothers and mend wounds from the Civil War.
Michael Katz and Keith Wailoo have discussed the role of private organizations and donations in
the healthcare of the city of Memphis, which was often a model city for northern Mississippi.
They addressed how political leaders recognized the negative impact of disease on the city,
sparking the municipal government to begin involving itself in public health through sanitation
measures, demonstrating a changing perception of the benefits that a common health provides.9
Finally, there is scholarship on the role of the federal government in public health and
how it helped respond to yellow fever epidemics. Katherine Vanderhook has looked at the legal
justification for federal and state quarantine laws and how the powers of the federal government
increased after the Civil War. J. M. Michael has researched the brief history and demise of the
National Board of Health, which lasted from 1879-1883. It collapsed due to controversy
surrounding state and federal authority and internal resistance to centralization, marking the
failure of attempts to create a federal public health service for the next two decades.10
While there has been extensive writing on the 1878 yellow fever epidemic and its effects
on public health on cities like New Orleans and Memphis, there has been very little on the effects
of the epidemic on Mississippi specifically. For example, even though Nuwer’s Plague Among
the Magnolias focused on the narrative of the epidemic in urban and rural communities across
the state, it did not address the long-term impact it had on health in Mississippi. Her discussion
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of rural areas is also unique. The majority of Americans lived in rural communities at the time,
but, by associating yellow fever with city life, historians have ignored its effect on most of the
population. Mississippi provides a good model for these regions because it was a rural state and
it embodied the individualistic attitudes and preference for local control that rural states
exhibited across the country.11 These attitudes contributed to Mississippi health reformers’
failure to establish an effective public health organization after the 1878 epidemic.
More broadly, Americans in the nineteenth century experienced a transition from a public
health system that was focused on disaster mitigation to one that encouraged more preventative
measures in the fight against disease. Around the start of the nineteenth century, some cities
created health boards as a response to disease outbreaks, but these boards were not permanent
solutions. For example, in New Orleans, the municipal government created a city board of health
in 1804 in response to a yellow fever outbreak. The new board oversaw some sanitation and
quarantine efforts, but it was not fully independent, as its actions needed approval from the city
council. The council did not renew it the next year. Two other health boards also dissolved
shortly after their formations, and city officials did not create a permanent board until 1841.12
Furthermore, the federal government’s focus on public health, like that of the states and
cities, was one that merely reacted to disease outbreaks and sought to limit their spread rather
than enact measures to prevent it outright. The first federal law that addressed quarantines was
passed on June 9, 1794, and it enabled states to impose duties on ships arriving from foreign
ports.13 This law, however, merely granted permission to states to respond to epidemics and did
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not permit a federal response. On May 27, 1796, Congress passed “An Act Relative to
Quarantine” that allowed the Department of the Treasury to oversee quarantine efforts and on
July 16, 1798, it established the Marine Hospital Service to observe and assist states with their
quarantines. Yet, Congress did not give the Service authority to enact or enforce any
quarantine.14
Despite being the prevailing public health measure, government officials and business
leaders did not like quarantines. They negatively impacted cities due to the creation of an unsafe
reputation and the loss of trade, and they were merely reactive. Furthermore, officials enacted
quarantines in both the North and the South, but they focused on cities, which were at a higher
risk of epidemics due to dirtier conditions, denser populations, and increased traffic of goods and
people. By the 1830s most American cities had begun sanitary reform movements as a way to
prevent disease and to avoid harming commerce. Repeated outbreaks of Asiatic cholera, which
was considered a “filth disease,” drove these reforms in Northern cities.15
In the South there were far fewer large cities. New Orleans, however, was notorious for
its repeated encounters with disease. Quarantines were also the prevailing public health measure
there in the early and mid-nineteenth century, and they often elicited a negative political
response. Businessmen in New Orleans, who depended on trade along the Mississippi River to
maintain their profits, fought the notions that yellow fever was contagious and that quarantines
would be effective against it. Even after a Mississippi physician’s epidemiological data of an
1853 yellow fever epidemic led to a general scientific consensus that yellow fever was
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contagious, some doctors still dissented.16 As late as 1878, Dr. Thomas O. Summers declared, “Is
Yellow Fever contagious? Most assuredly not,” in his book on the 1878 yellow fever epidemic in
Tennessee, and instead blamed it on the humid weather.17 The lack of boards of health in most
Southern states exacerbated the reluctance to enforce quarantines on the local level. Meanwhile,
corruption and nepotism plagued the Marine Hospital Service, whose role was to advise local
authorities on when and how to quarantine possible disease carriers, rendering it ineffective.18
New Orleans served as an influential model for the livelihoods of southern
Mississippians. In north Mississippi, Memphis served as the cultural model. Both of these cities
had a history with yellow fever and both had health boards—the Louisiana Board of Health and
the Memphis Board of Health—that coordinated quarantine efforts.19 These government boards
did little to provide material aid to the citizens of their cities, however. Government funding of
“outdoor relief,” assistance in the form of goods and money, had become unpopular around the
nation.20 J. M. Keating, the editor of the Memphis Appeal newspaper, wrote that the post-Civil
War era was “one of extravagance throughout the Union.” Furthermore, “municipalities were
freely bled for…unnecessary public and semi-public improvements. Appropriations of public
monies were made in the most reckless way.”21
The era Keating referred to, Reconstruction, was a tumultuous time in the South, when
federal troops occupied the region and enacted programs to transition it away from a
16
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slaveholding society—an effort that most elite white Southerners resented. Congress created the
Freedmen’s Bureau to provide aid for former slaves in the form of “provisions, clothing, and
fuel…for the immediate and temporary shelter and supply of destitute and suffering refugees and
freedmen and their wives and children.”22 It also established hospitals that administered medical
care and acted as almshouses for African Americans when existing ones turned them away.
Federal lawmakers resisted paying for these hospitals at a federal level, meaning local
communities often had to contribute. Oliver Otis Howard, the director of the Freedmen’s Bureau,
wrote, “From the start I felt sure that the relief offered by the Bureau to refugees and
freedmen…[was] abnormal to our system of government….We [labored] hard to reduce the
number of freedmen’s courts, hospitals, asylums, and eleemosynary [charitable] features.” He
continued, “the majority of whites in the South were…very unfriendly to the Freedmen’s
Bureau.”23 It furthered their distrust of a larger government and harmed efforts to implement
systems of government aid.24
The whites who bemoaned aid for blacks in the South were much less resistant to aid for
whites. Widespread economic devastation caused by the Civil War prompted Southern whites to
call for direct relief to soldiers’ families. The Confederate and state governments rationed food,
controlled prices, and took control of the railroads. Direct public aid to whites grew to a grand
scale. In Alabama, for example, at least one quarter of all whites received public assistance from
the government, and the majority of the Confederacy’s tax revenue went to distributing food
directly to the poor. The rations were meager, though, and bread riots broke out in several
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Southern cities.25 After the war, the federal government provided the bulk of the aid in the South,
which it distributed to whites as well as blacks. The Freedmen’s Bureau provided assistance to
members of both races, and whites even received more relief than blacks from the Bureau in
Alabama. Southern states also created indirect welfare systems that focused on helping whites,
such as the establishment of public schools, in an elite effort to win the allegiance of poor whites
and create racial solidarity.26
White supremacists tapped into and inflamed opposition to Reconstruction in the South,
and they launched a two-pronged approach to gain control over Southern states’ governments
and end Reconstruction in a period known as Redemption. They started in Mississippi in 1874,
where Redeemers worked through the Democratic Party to win elections throughout the state.
Their leader was Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, a former Congressman and member of
Mississippi’s secession committee before the Civil War, which declared that “utter subjugation
await[ed them] in the Union.”27 To secure these elections, white supremacists began a campaign
of terror to suppress or kill African American and white Republican voters. They first acted in
Vicksburg, Mississippi, during their municipal elections on August 5, 1874. Armed whites killed
blacks at a political rally, stood watch at voting booths, and “impressed upon the whole city that
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fear which comes naturally from an organized and irresponsible mob prepared for violence.”28
Their efforts succeeded, and Democrats won in a sweeping victory.29
After their triumph in Vicksburg, white supremacists incited violence throughout the rest
of the state. Editors of the Weekly Clarion, a Democratic newspaper based in Jackson,
Mississippi, argued that the Republican Party was formed as the “black man’s party,” which
sought to “remit those States [with a negro majority] to the indefinite control of the African
race.” Furthermore, they wrote, “white men should, in self-defense, form a similar
organization…[or] our State seems doomed to destruction.”30 In short, white Democrats equated
black political participation with black domination and resolved to end it. President Ulysses S.
Grant’s decision to not send federal troops to put down the violent attacks encouraged further
armed aggression. L. Q. C. Lamar condemned the violence, but he claimed that it happened
within black communities, and that white violence was greatly exaggerated.31 He argued that the
solution was “a discontinuance of Federal supervision” in the South.32 Ultimately, the Redeemers
succeeded when the Mississippi legislature elected Lamar to the United States Senate in 1875
and Adelbert Ames, the Republican governor of Mississippi, resigned on March 29, 1876.
Democrats then implemented the “Mississippi Plan” in states across the South.33
Since Southern state governments were in turmoil in the 1870s, and their architects
denounced state relief, private charity organizations provided what aid was available. These
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organizations were important during times of crisis to return communities to normalcy,
especially in a period when many wealthy citizens across the country argued that government
relief was immoral and ineffective.34 In New Orleans and Memphis, the major source of private
aid in the mid- to late nineteenth century was the Howard Association, an organization that
young businessmen founded in New Orleans to dedicate funds and medical care to victims of
yellow fever outbreaks. Its relief efforts, though, focused solely on providing treatment and aid
during epidemics. It was unable to fund preventative public health reforms. Other groups, such
as the Masons and the Odd Fellows, faced similar restrictions, indicating that voluntarism could
only attempt to ameliorate the damages from an outbreak. Only governmental reform could enact
meaningful change.35
While these cities were an important model for Mississippians, the state of Mississippi
was overwhelmingly rural in the mid- and late nineteenth century, and doctors did not believe
that yellow fever was an issue for rural communities. In 1874, one Tennessee physician wrote,
“yellow fever is peculiarly a disease of cities, where large numbers of people are crowded
together and effete animal matters are allowed to pollute the atmosphere.”36 Since the public
health movement began in cities, largely as a response to diseases like cholera in the North and
yellow fever in the South, rural areas of Mississippi that doctors believed to be immune to
disease had very few, if any, health regulations. Both a lack of money to fund a robust public
health service and a general distrust in all levels of government compounded this issue as
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conflicts between the vestiges of the Republican Reconstruction and resurgent Democratic forces
collided. Even though the legislature of Mississippi created the Mississippi Board of Health and
directed the creation of county boards of health in 1877 and 1878, it was still unorganized and
only nominally enforced by the summer of 1878.37 These conditions set the scene that allowed
the yellow fever epidemic of 1878 to be among the worst recorded outbreaks that the Mississippi
Valley had ever seen.
The first case of yellow fever in this epidemic happened on July 13th in New Orleans, but
it was not reported until July 26th. In response, doctors from Memphis established quarantine
stations along major railroads both around Memphis and in Mississippi towns such as Grenada.
Unfortunately for both, the inefficiency of health reporting and the slow travel of news meant
that these quarantines were too late to stop the disease.38 Furthermore, massive expansion of
railroads in the 1870s connected inland communities to New Orleans and other coastal regions
like never before. These rail lines enabled refugees to flee yellow fever outbreaks and carry the
disease with them to vulnerable communities. Since yellow fever historically only infected port
communities, inland areas had weaker quarantine protocols—if they had any at all.39 The 1878
outbreak eventually reached as far north as Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and as far east as Florida,
but it impacted the Mississippi River Valley the most.40
Grenada was one town in this region that was representative of many rural towns in
Mississippi. It had no sanitary infrastructure, and its sewer was an often dry brook that flowed
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through the town. Excrement was “exposed to fester in the sun and exhale its impurities into the
atmosphere,” and it was “extremely offensive.” Furthermore, “privy vaults…[were] easily
pervious to water, and very rarely emptied.”41 The town was also situated along a river, and it
experienced hot, humid summers. Many doctors, like Thomas O. Summers, argued these
conditions were responsible for yellow fever, although Grenada had never before experienced an
outbreak of the disease.42
Because Grenada had not had an encounter with Yellow Jack before, it was unprepared
for the outbreak in 1878. When the town’s Board of Supervisors met at the beginning of August,
they did not once mention yellow fever.43 Mrs. Capt. Fields, the first Grenada case and the first
case in Mississippi, contracted the disease on July 20th and died on July 31st. Ten of her thirteen
family members also got sick. Seven died and only three recovered. A panic ensued in which
“everybody who was able to get away fled as speedily as possible.”44 Around 1,000 of the town’s
1,300 white residents and about 200 of the town’s 1,200 black residents fled to camps a few
miles outside Grenada or to other towns. More of Grenada’s black residents left at the first signs
of yellow fever, but they returned to their homes in the predominantly black southwestern
quarter of the town since the outbreak had not yet touched it, and, more significantly, they were
unable to afford to stay away. While the camps escaped the disease, residents that went
elsewhere carried the disease with them.45 A St. Louis Globe-Democrat correspondent
summarized the dire situation of Grenada by proclaiming that “the most fearful war could not
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have produced a greater desolation.”46 An author for the New York Herald wrote, “In all Grenada
there is not a store open, not a market house, not a saloon. The Howards (with the exception of
Rev. Mr. McCracken and Mr. Ringgold) are the only people who are at work.”47 The community
was in disarray and its economy had shut down.
Due to the devastation, the town sought outside help for relief from several organizations. “There
came a most anxious call for nurses and physicians,” wrote J. M. Keating for the Howard
Association, and John Logan Power, the director of the Masons’ and Odd Fellows’ relief efforts
in Mississippi, recorded that the Masons contributed $729.75 and the Odd Fellows $1361.10 in
aid.48 The disbursement of the relief, though, encountered difficulties when Col. Anderson, the
representative of the Howard Association in Grenada, died of the disease. “There is no member
of our association at Grenada,” wrote J. P. Smith on September 6th, and the administration of
charity relief fell to two rival factions in Grenada: the Relief Committee and the Sub-Relief
Committee.49
John Powell and Robert Mullen sat on the Grenada Relief Committee, which managed
and spent the relief monies from the various charity organizations, most notably the Howards.
They did not feel safe in Grenada, though, so they fled the town with hundreds of its other
citizens and conducted business four miles away in a refugee camp, promising “to have a
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Illustration 1: “Catholic Sisters of Charity” 50 The Catholic Sisters of Charity was one of several private
charity groups that provided food to the victims of the yellow fever epidemic, especially women and children.

messenger who will go in daily so that [they] can keep up a close communication and act in
concert for the best interest of [their] people and the trust committed to [them].”51 Their distance,
however, led some in the town to resent them and argue that they did not fulfill their duties. Dr.
W. C. McCracken, who was included among the relief workers by the New York Herald
correspondent, urged the people of Grenada to remove them from the Relief Committee because
“they have failed to act as a relief committee.” When his motion failed, Dr. McCracken instead
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successfully moved to create a Sub-Relief Committee that included him and two others who
were in Grenada and providing relief themselves.52
While organizers were able to dispense aid “to all, rich and poor, black and white,” their
feud over the expenditure of relief money and who played a larger role in the aid of Grenada’s
residents continued for years afterward. Evidence of the dispute is exemplified in a letter from a
friend of Dr. McCracken, who reassured him that “all the general visiting work, done after
[August 28th], was performed by you solely and alone. I know it to be a fact that you walked over
the town carrying baskets and bundles, containing medicine and nourishment for the sick” and
“philanthropy…is a thankless investment, your motives are misconstrued.”53 The conflict in
Grenada, while more dramatic than in many other towns, provides a clear example of the chaos
caused by the epidemic and the confusing nature of public health in Mississippi, where many
organizations and people tried to take charge and organizational hierarchies were nominal at
best.
The plight of the South during the epidemic was so severe that the private relief charities
that traditionally were able to help towns recover struggled, and Congress did not provide any
money to the Marine Hospital Service to help due to the prevailing belief that aid should come
from private sources.54 The Grenada Relief Committee emphasized their lack of funds, writing
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Illustration 2: “For The Fever-Stricken—Collection Of Clothing In New York” 55 Americans from all across
the country donated to relief efforts to help the victims of the yellow fever epidemic.

that when “[Physicians’ and Nurses’] services can be disposed with, it is important that this
should be done, as we may lack funds to pay.”56 Southern politicians and newspaper editors
telegraphed an appeal to chambers of commerce across the country, writing, “great as has been
the charity, the necessity is yet greater and the sums subscribed are yet inadequate to the wants of
the suffering.”57 Dramatic cartoons of hungry and destitute families—usually women and
children—and of long lines of men and women willing to donate supplies helped inspire people
from outside the South to contribute to the yellow fever relief effort. Citizens from over 30 states
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and territories contributed money and supplies to the Masons and the Odd Fellows.58 Fundraising
methods were also creative. For example, William Lloyd Garrison organized a fair in Tarrytown,
New York, “in behalf of the yellow fever sufferers at the South” in which there were “one or two
hundred tickets of admission, at ten cents each.”59 According to Edward J. Blum, the epidemic
even helped heal the last vestiges of contempt from the Civil War that remained between white
Northerners and Southerners, as it provided a national emergency that united the people of both
regions in their relief efforts. He further argued that, “while northern and southern whites reveled
in their newfound solidarity, they also joined together to neglect the medical needs of southern
blacks.”60
Black Mississippians, who accounted for 72.7% of Grenada County’s population and
57.5% of the state’s population in 1880, received significantly less aid than their white
counterparts.61 American health systems underwent vast improvements in the late nineteenth
century, but white politicians and reformers privileged white recipients with care and routinely
denied similar benefits to black, immigrant, and other minority populations. While voluntary aid
agencies in Grenada claim to have distributed supplies to all members of every race and class,
they did not keep statistics on how equitable this distribution was. As a general trend across the
South, white relief agencies often focused on helping wealthier white women and children while
limiting aid to poor whites and almost completely excluding African Americans. Black
communities organized their own training and relief programs, but without access to the political
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or economic systems that benefited white southerners, those programs had fewer available
resources.62 This meant that when yellow fever struck, African Americans were hit even harder
than whites. “To the Colored People of the United States….Our people are suffering, dying and
destitute,” wrote New York City’s Colored Preachers’ Aid Society in the New York Herald. They
cried, “for Heaven’s sake relieve us all you can by sending us means. We are not able to bury our
dead or to nurse and feed the sick and destitute.”63 During the epidemic, the situation for most
African Americans in Mississippi was dire.
Even in their grim state, African Americans contributed to relief efforts, often
disproportionately relative to their wealth and status. According to late nineteenth century
physicians, they were more resistant to yellow fever.64 They were also less able to flee towns and
cities when the disease struck. Black workers thus held vital jobs when whites would or could
not. In Memphis, for example, the city government hired black policemen, a sign of desperation
in a time when whites were driving blacks out of all positions of power.65 In Grenada, one
thousand African Americans remained after the panic caused by the first cases of disease,
compared to only 325 whites. When looting and assaults increased during the chaos, J. H.
Campbell, a Democrat and the sole remaining white member of the city council, worked with the
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black city councilors who stayed behind to establish a black police force. According to Dianne
Stephens Nuwer, Democratic officials in the violent Redemption-era Mississippi were expected
to express suspicion of African Americans. Campbell demonstrated his distrust by refusing to
arm the black police officers and, in a letter to the governor, he complained that the force was
“composed of Negroes in whom [he had] as much confidence as [he could] place in a negro.”
Still, the turmoil wrought by the yellow fever epidemic meant “it was the best [he could] do.”66
African Americans also acted as “common laborers” and gravediggers in Grenada, and
the Relief Committee promised to pay them one or two dollars a day, respectively. When the
workers were actually paid for their services, though, members of the Relief Committee were
suspicious of their “very large” payments, which they felt the need to “scrutinize and see that
they [were] correct.”67 A black nurse was even one of the causes of the dispute between the
Relief Committee and the Sub-Relief Committee. The Sub-Relief Committee recorded that
“Henry Young (colored) nursed faithfully Mrs. Ed Sherman for twenty five days at $2.00 per day
for…$50.00.”68 The members of the Relief Committee responded by reiterating their policy that
“no nurses were to be paid only on Doctors Certificates,” (documents from physicians that
certified whether a nurse or patient was eligible for relief) and that they needed to be approved
by members of the Relief Committee.69 They did not approve a black nurse. Instead, Grenada’s
white leaders prioritized white supremacy over public health. Despite claims of interracialism,
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white Southerners could not overcome their aversion to African Americans in political power or
their distrust of black motives, even in a time of crisis.
Undeterred by racial tensions, African Americans donated money and supplies to both
black and white citizens in Grenada. George D. Dillard, the mayor of Macon, Mississippi,
informed J. L. Power that “the colored people here…raised fifty-one dollars and sent it to
Grenada. The ladies can send sheets, towels, pillow cases, etc., if such things are needed.”
Furthermore, he said, “the colored people wish to know if poultry cannot be transported
to…Grenada…if so they can set up a large quantity.”70 In spite of their work during the
epidemic, the general public often did not even recognize African Americans. The New York
Herald, for example, compiled the names of dozens of whites who died in the epidemic from
newspapers in Memphis and Mississippi, but it included only statements like “a colored man
died at six o’clock this evening” to recognize black victims.71
Over the course of the entire epidemic, the Howard Association spent over $1.1 million
on relief.72 Most of the money and supplies went to white widows and orphans, indicating the
segregated nature of late nineteenth century charities and the prevailing belief that providing help
to African Americans and working-age men created an immoral system of paupers, even in the
midst of a deadly epidemic.73 The War Department also gave food to fever-stricken areas, but
“there was no shadow of law to authorize these appropriations” according to the editors of
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Jackson’s Weekly Clarion. Instead, “[the authority] was found in the instincts of humanity.”74
Overall, the interstate nature of the epidemic and the response to it demonstrated that individual
states were not always able to handle large epidemics on their own. Furthermore, it caused many
doctors and politicians, such as Mississippi Senator Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, to call
for stronger federal control over public health.
A few months before the yellow fever epidemic, on April 29, 1878, the United States
Congress passed a law titled “An Act to Prevent the Introduction of Contagious or Infectious
Diseases into the United States” after yellow fever outbreaks in Cuba and the West Indies ignited
fears of it spreading to Gulf Coast states. The law, though, was not very extensive. It granted the
Marine Hospital Service the ability to gather disease outbreak data from around the world, but it
only enabled the Service to enforce quarantines in ports, and it did not even appropriate funds for
its new responsibilities. It also explicitly prohibited federal involvement on quarantine within
states.75 This law served as a moderate compromise in the debate over local or federal control of
quarantine procedures, but many politicians quickly dismissed it as inadequate when Congress
next met.
President Rutherford B. Hayes opened the third session of the Forty-Fifth Congress on
December 2, 1878, where he recognized the large impact of the yellow fever epidemic and called
for Congress to address it:
The fearful spread of this pestilence has awakened a very general public sentiment in
favor of national sanitary administration, which shall not only control quarantine, but
74
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have the sanitary supervision of internal commerce in times of epidemics…[and have]
power to deal with whatever endangers the public health…. It is recommended that
Congress give to the whole subject early and careful consideration.76
That same day, several Southern senators, including L. Q. C. Lamar, introduced proposals to
create congressional committees to investigate the outbreak. Then, on December 10, Lamar
introduced Senate Bill 1462, which would create a department of health that would gain
oversight over the Marine Hospital Service, control the quarantine and sanitary efforts of the
federal government, and be led by a newly created Cabinet-level officer. He also designed the
bill so this public health agency would be able to administer quarantines throughout the United
States under the Interstate Commerce Clause.77 Lamar’s introduction of a bill to expand the
power of the federal government is notable because he had helped lead the effort to expel federal
troops and leaders from the South during the Redemption movement. He was even willing to risk
political scandal by working with Alex R. Shepherd, chairman of the Yellow Fever National
Relief Commission, to secure funding for the Catholic and Protestant Orphan Asylums in
Vicksburg, Mississippi, because “the vital interests of the South…prompted all that [he did].”78
One of the reasons for his dramatic shift in thought was his recognition that the yellow fever
epidemic of 1878 was devastating for his state, which did not have the resources to address it
alone.
The nascent Mississippi Board of Health also participated in the movement for a stronger
federal public health system. At the American Public Health Association’s Richmond, Virginia,
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meeting in November 1878, where yellow fever was the dominant issue, representatives of the
Board reported that “[Sanitary measures] proved utterly futile in arresting its progression. The
disease spread in spite of them.” Furthermore, the 1878 epidemic “demonstrated how difficult,
how well-nigh impossible, it is to arrest…yellow fever when it has once reached our
shores….The use of disinfectants [has] proven wholly ineffectual.” They concluded that “the
utter failure of [existing] quarantine regulations…has sufficiently demonstrated their inadequacy
to afford us protection….We do most earnestly recommend that Congress take such action as
will afford to these states the means of making the quarantine of these ports as rigid and effectual
as possible.”79 The federal government, they argued, had the best chance of protecting
Americans from yellow fever.
Ultimately, Lamar’s bill did not become law. The Senate referred it to the Select
Committee to Investigate and Report the Best Means of Preventing the Introduction and Spread
of Epidemic Diseases, where it died.80 A coalition of Northern congressmen and some Southern
ones who argued that quarantines should remain under state control defeated a similarly
expansive bill in the House of Representatives from Casey Young, the Representative of
Memphis. Members of this coalition argued that, rather than wanting to help the victims of the
epidemic, Southern legislators were instead pursuing the political goal of attacking state powers
through a federal quarantine system, as exemplified in Thomas Nast’s cartoon “Another ‘Federal
Interference.’” The editors of the Memphis Avalanche were so incensed that they declared the
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Illustration 3: “Another ‘Federal Interference,’ the Struggle between Athena Hygeia and Yellow Jack”81
Supporters of strong states’ rights feared increased federal powers after the epidemic.

Southerners who helped defeat the bill to be “nincompoops who fall down once a day and
worship the glimmering ghost of the state rights abstractions.”82
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Instead, the committee produced Senate Bill 1784, “A Bill to Prevent the Introduction of
Infectious or Contagious Disease into the United States and to Establish a National Board of
Health.” The Board’s functions would be gathering information on contagious diseases, advising
the federal and state governments on public health matters, and devising a system for national
quarantines to be presented to Congress. The bill, like previous ones, did not empower a federal
agency to enact internal quarantines. It passed on March 3, 1879, with Lamar voting in favor.
Congress passed another law, “An Act to Prevent the Introduction of Contagious or Infectious
Diseases into the United States” on June 2, 1879, that limited the powers of the National Board
of Health to a four year period, meaning they would need to be reauthorized in 1883.83
In its first ever report, the National Board of Health demonstrated the importance of
yellow fever to its function. It opened with the purpose of the organization, which explicitly
included the investigation of yellow fever in Cuba, and it devoted a significant portion of the
report to causes, locations, and prevention of the disease.84 One issue with the effectiveness of
officials’ response, though, was that the cause of yellow fever was still unknown. The
Congressional Commission on Yellow Fever directed physicians to study the “meteorological
phenomena…character of soil…and forms of vegetable growth” in its desperate quest to better
understand the disease.85 The National Health Board recognized that “practitioners of medicine,
obtaining their livelihood by their skill exclusively in the cure of disease, are by no means
necessarily well instructed in the etiology and prevention of disease” and it argued that “Naval
surgeons, and especially those among them charged with marine sanitation, are of all other
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medical men best entitled to credence and confidence in this matter.”86 These surgeons, in their
1881 report on the yellow fever outbreak on the U.S.S. Plymouth, concluded that “the cause of
yellow fever is a product of the development of a microscopic vegetable organism,” a reflection
of the revolutionary impact of the germ theory on the study of disease. They then wrote,
Of the five concurrent conditions which appear to be necessary to the production of an
epidemic of yellow fever, namely high temperature, humidity, a suitable nidus [site of
bacterial replication], a peculiar meteorological state, and the presence of the germ, only
two are such as can reasonably be expected to be preventable, and these two are humidity
and a suitable nidus.87
Naval officials recommended anchoring ships offshore to change the humid environment on the
ship, which they believed help yellow fever propagate.88 Such advice was essentially useless to
public health officials on land, however, as they were unable to reasonably change the humidity
in their communities.
Furthermore, many physicians argued that yellow fever was not directly contagious so
there must be some reservoir of germs that could be destroyed. In response, the Marine Hospital
Service began fumigating ships and later houses and trains, in an effort to prevent its spread.89
The debate on the cause of yellow fever was divided between contagionists, who believed it was
an imported disease, and sanitarians, who believed it arose from dirt and filth. At the end of the
nineteenth century, American physicians came to accept Cuban epidemiologist Carlos Finlay’s
theory that Aedes aegypti mosquitoes transmitted yellow fever, and representatives of the U.S.
Army Yellow Fever Commission presented it to the annual American Public Health Association
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Photograph 1: “U.S. Postal Car, Mail, Passengers, and Box Cars at Mail Fumigation Station, 1880-1900”90 The U.S.
Marine Hospital Service would use train cars as yellow fever disinfection stations at the request of state authorities.

meeting on October 23, 1900.91 This revelation did not come in time to save the National Board
of Health. The New York Times reported that “a genuine surprise” occurred at the 1884
Conference of State Boards of Health when the members of the conference declined to endorse
an extension of funding for the Board.92
The absence of large yellow fever outbreaks in the time immediately after 1878 and
physicians’ inability to determine definitive etiology and prevention methods of the disease all
contributed to a feeling that continued funding was pointless. Additionally, some members of
Congress remained skeptical of the intentions of the Board. “The great bulk of their
money…goes in their own machinery,” wrote Senator James Beck of Kentucky. “Any amount of
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money that is necessary if the yellow fever breaks out...I am perfectly willing to give; but it
seems to me that we have given them as much as it is fairly safe to give men…who do not seem
to be practicing any sort of economy,” he added. Then he expressed his deepest concern: “I
suppose it will not be two years before this National Board of Health…will be running every
city, every neighborhood, entering houses where they like, breaking up State organizations as
they please, and demanding any amount of money.”93 The Times summarized the broader
sentiment of Congress by declaring that its members “impatiently characterized [the Board] as an
excrescence.”94 The Marine Hospital Service regained control over national quarantines on
March 2, 1883, when the law creating the National Board of Health expired.95
The Mississippi Board of Health experienced similar frustrations. In 1877, the
Mississippi State Medical Association made its first foray into public health. It lobbied the state
legislature to create a board of health. Although the legislature did create a board, the
Association lamented its lack of actual power in their 1877 meeting at Grenada. “A bill was
presented at the last session of the Legislature, which, after being completely emasculated and
radically altered, was passed….It is needless to say that, in its present form, the law is worthless
to the State,” reported the Association’s executive committee. The committee went on to say the
statute was nonbinding, and it predicted that it “will be amended and made effective whenever its
capacities and benefits shall be demonstrated and fully appreciated.”96
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Furthermore, according to Dr. J. F. Hunter, the secretary of the Board in 1903, “there was
no money appropriated by the legislature for the use of the Board for the first few years.”97 It
was so underfunded that, for the official trip to the Richmond American Public Health
Association meeting, members of the delegation had to pay their travel expenses using their
personal money.98 Under these conditions it is no surprise that the government public health
infrastructure was so sparse in Mississippi, creating a need for private relief.
During the 1878 epidemic, though, local governments did mount some degree of a
response. When Grenada first reported 50 cases of yellow fever on August 12, 1878, towns
throughout the state created health boards and implemented quarantines. These towns also
sprayed disinfectants like carbolic acid, burned clothes and bedding from infected patients, and
quickly buried dead bodies. Some communities even escaped the disease, like Jefferson County,
which stationed mounted police along its 70 mile border to enforce its quarantine.99 Even though
the state board could only coordinate information between these boards, health officials did make
efforts to prevent the spread of the disease.
The Mississippi State Medical Association’s prediction came true after the yellow fever
epidemic. In 1880 the state legislature strengthened the state board, granting it the ability to form
an executive council that could act on behalf of the Board while it was not meeting, to conduct
oversight over county health officers, and to direct district attorneys to enforce vital statistics
reporting and health regulations. It also increased funding to the Board in 1880 and again in 1882
after fears of another yellow fever outbreak. Carroll Kendrick, a Mississippi legislator and
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president of the Mississippi State Medical Association from 1898-1899, wrote, “When the
yellow fever epidemic swept over the South like a cyclone in 1878 we had no board of health
with money to fight the awful plague….There were men in the legislature who could see nothing
but selfish motive in everything the doctors desired.” He continued, “The fever in 1878 did more
than all else…to prove that the doctors were right. After that fearful scourge the legislature was
willing to come to our aid. Since we have a well-equipped board of health yellow fever…has
become almost a thing of the past, remembered only as a hideous dream.”100 Yellow fever was
the catalyst for the creation of a state public health system in Mississippi.
The epidemic also sparked calls for reform at a local level. The editors of the Weekly
Clarion of Jackson, Mississippi, wrote, “whatever may be done…by the State authorities, for
public protection against a recurrence of the yellow fever pestilence, they should leave nothing
undone.” In an appeal to enact sanitary reforms, they wrote, “medical and sanitary
authorities…decided that drainage…and cleanliness are efficacious in warding off a yellow fever
pestilence. Whatever is necessary to bring about this healthy condition of the town should be
done.” Finally, they even supported a tax to reimburse citizens whose possessions were burned to
prevent the spread of the disease: “Our citizens can better afford to submit to a small tax…than
to choose between flight from their homes and enduring the horrors of a plague.”101
Even after reforms, Mississippi’s public health system in the late nineteenth century was
not designed to cope with much more than a yellow fever epidemic. Dr. J. F. Hunter, in his letter
to the Surgeon-General in 1903, outlined the structure of the system. There were county boards
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of health that reported to the state board, but the state legislature had passed no law to require the
county boards to collect or report vital statistics, and it designed the system solely around
quarantines. The state still relied heavily on the Public Health and Marine Hospital Service for
assistance when addressing outbreaks (Congress expanded the Marine Hospital Service in
1902).102 The legislature also created an exemption to allow county health boards to avoid
having a health officer that reported to the state board, weakening it even further.103
Additionally, in a report to the Fourth Annual Conference of State and Territorial Health
Officers in 1906, Dr. Hunter described the state public health system through a lens of
quarantines and epidemic-prevention techniques. The legislature had not passed sanitation or
other health laws, and yellow fever remained the main focus.104 In 1896, for example, the Union
Female College in Oxford, Mississippi, experienced an outbreak of typhoid fever. The school’s
administration, not any government, enforced a quarantine of the sick students, and it was
responsible for renovating the water system and checking to ensure that it was safe.105 Typhoid
fever, evidently, was not a disease that could inspire fear like Yellow Jack.
While the 1878 yellow fever epidemic did spark new interest in enforcing public health
measures in Mississippi, the state still lagged behind many others in America. Its system focused
on preventing the introduction and spread of the disease, but it did not work to address its cause,
largely because scientists had not yet reached a consensus. After health officials accepted
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Finlay’s theory that mosquitoes transmitted yellow fever, they began working on methods to
eradicate it. In 1898, William Gorgas, “by the most brilliant sanitary experiment ever made, put
an end to the disease in its very stronghold,” Havana, Cuba, through mosquito control methods
like fumigating infested areas, improving drainage, and covering standing water with
kerosene.106 At the Second Annual Conference of State and Territorial Health Officers, Edmond
Souchon, the president of the Louisiana State Board of Health, provided an outline of prevention
techniques, which focused on sanitary reforms and controlling water sources. He prefaced his
report by stating “the cardinal and ideal principle to prevent the spread of yellow fever in a
locality is to make that locality mosquito proof….The problem is an engineering one
altogether.”107 Officials enacted these reforms across the country, and they received support from
businesses, like Woodward, Wight, & Co. of New Orleans, who helped spread awareness about
the fight against mosquitoes through advertisements and postcards. Citizens committees also
encouraged mosquito-proofing techniques, such as one in New Orleans that distributed buttons
with the slogan “My cisterns are all right; how are yours?” to encourage people to cover their
cisterns in screens or oil.108 The anti-mosquito methods were successful, and the last yellow
fever epidemic in the United States occurred in 1905. By 1914, “the disease [was]…eradicated.

106

Charles V. Chapin, “Dirt, Disease, and the Health Officer,” Public Health Papers and Reports Presented at the
Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association (1902), 28 (1903): 296-299; Eduardo
Faerstein and Warren Winkelstein Jr., “William Gorgas: Yellow Fever Meets Its Nemesis.” Epidemiology vol. 2,
issue 6 (November 2011): 872; and Harvard University Open Collections Program. “William Gorgas, 1854-1920.”
Contagion: Historical Views of Diseases and Epidemics. Accessed November 12, 2017.
http://ocp.hul.harvard.edu/contagion/gorgas.html.
107
Treasury Department. U.S. Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service. Transactions of the Second Annual
Conference of State and Territorial Health Officers with the United States Public Health and Marine-Hospital
Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), 59-65.
108
“Yellow Fever in New Orleans.” The Independent, August 3, 1905, in The Independent Volume LIX (Independent
Publications, New York, NY, 1905), 233-234.

34

Illustration 4: “Fighting Mosquitoes”109 A postcard from 1905 by Woodward, Wight, & Co., a supply house in New
Orleans. It demonstrates the popular sentiment for reforms to fight mosquitoes and yellow fever.

The ‘yellow jack’ [had] completely lost its power to produce fear….The new [prevention method
was] humane and effective.”110
Yet this story is a story of failure. Yellow fever did not improve Mississippi’s public
health efforts in the long term. During that last epidemic in 1905, counties set up shotgun
quarantines, as they had for many previous encounters with the disease. Armed police lined the
borders of the county and blocked people from entering. But in one county, a quarantine officer
faced a conundrum: a mob that sought to lynch “that [damn] negro, Sam.” A correspondent for
the New York Tribune wrote that “the quarantine guard fell back as if yellow fever was no more
dangerous than chilblains,” a slight rash from the cold. The mob found Sam, lynched him, and
rode home. The correspondent concluded by stating “a lynching party surely does have
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rights.”111 When the lynch mob first rode up to the quarantine officer, they presented him with a
dilemma. He could either let them pass so they could enforce white supremacy, or he could block
them and protect the health of his county. By granting the mob entry, the officer put the lives of
his entire community in danger. He could have chosen to protect both his community and the
victim of the lynch mob, but he followed the dictates of white supremacy and sacrificed both.
His decision was a continuation of the trend set in the 1878 epidemic, demonstrating that
attitudes toward the choice between health and power had not changed.
Without yellow fever to encourage officials to fund public health efforts, the health
movement in Mississippi faltered. It would take the intervention of outside health officers and
two chronic, slow-acting diseases—hookworm disease and pellagra—to demonstrate the
importance of public health and convince legislators to establish a system beyond one of just
quarantines around the start of World War I.112 Even today epidemics spark public fear. The
H1N1/09, or swine flu, outbreak in 2009 caused a panic and calls for reform, but these efforts
faded as public attention moved away from the disease and on to the next alarming issue.113
Improving public health systems is a long, difficult process that faces resistance for its high costs
and inconvenience. Epidemics evoke anxiety in the public mind, making them a starting point for
public health campaigns, but they burn out quickly. Health reformers need to focus on longerlasting issues to enact meaningful change. More broadly, in segregated and unequal societies,
leaders prioritize control over public health, leaving everyone at a greater risk of disease. The
only way to achieve good health outcomes is to provide justice to all members of society.
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